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Abstract
Fiscal earnings, measures the performance of the company during the financial year. 
Motivated by different factors such as those related to the capital market, contractual 
motives etc, managers can manipulate earnings, increasing or reducing them and this 
phenomenon is recognized as “earnings management”.
If we accept that the initiatives of “earnings management” lead to distortion of the 
financial results, it means that financial reports can be considered as poor quality 
reports, and financial information provided to the users and various parties of interest 
is also of poor quality.
This paper is focused on reviewing the existing literature with regard to the Earnings 
Management in response to the growing pressure of investors, policy makers, and 
companies’ governance reform mechanisms to curb opportunistic behavior of the 
managers of these companies. It also examines the existence of this phenomenon in 
Albanian context as well as tests the importance of Modified Jones Model as an efficient 
tool for detection of abnormal accruals, used as a proxy for earnings management. 
The results show that firms in the Albanian market are engaged in earnings management 
initiatives.
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Introduction
Annual earning is an important indicator for investors and other interest parties, and 
it is reflected in the annual financial reports. It measures the performance of the 
company during the year and is calculated as the net result of revenues and expenses 
for the fiscal year. Managers for various reasons can affect the outcome by intervening 
or “manipulating” the figures reported. This intervention on the accounting earnings 
by managers is known with the term “earnings management”.
There is a large body of literature that explains this phenomenon. In theory it is not a 
“bad” phenomenon, and more so in many cases, it is legal. International and national 
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accounting standards have given accountants a free hand regarding accounting choices 
and evaluations. So it must be admitted that the results can be managed in many 
companies, but it is important that they are not classified as “unethical”.
Motivated by this fact, as well as the visible phenomena, similar to earnings 
management in Albanian market, this paper examines empirically, the existence of 
this phenomenon in Albanian context.
The content of this paper is organized as follows: 
 - A brief description of the existing literature on earnings management and 
hypothesis development
 - Definition of methodology and sample selection
 - Specification of the model
 - Empirical results and discussions
 - Conclusions and issues that will be of interest to be treated in the case of Albania.
Literature review and hypothesis development
Accounting is an information system, and serves to financial information users. 
Financial statements as the product of this system have the main objective to disclose 
the financial information in the context of economic decision-making. One of the 
important indicators for investors and other users of financial information is and annual 
earnings, which measures the performance of the company during the year and is 
calculated as the net result of revenues and expenses for the fiscal year. Managers for 
various motives can affect these results by intervening or “manipulating” the figures, 
reported. This intervention of managers, on the accounting earnings, is known with 
the term “earnings management”. 
As B.Van Praag (2001) defines, the existence of discretion in the reporting process 
creates a complex interaction between suppliers and users of financial information. 
The suppliers will take the effects of certain accounting decisions into account when 
preparing the financial statement. Users of these statements will in turn try to assess 
the reliability of these statements and attempt to interpret them in the knowledge 
that the statements are open to management discretion.
In fact, this phenomenon is well known. In theory it is not a “bad” phenomenon, and 
more so in many cases, it is legal. International and national accounting standards 
have given accountants a free hand regarding accounting choices and evaluations, 
so the results may differ. As it is stated in Dachow and Skinner (2000), “some 
earnings management” is expected and should exist. This is necessary because of the 
fundamental need for judgements and estimates to implement accruals accounting. 
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These judgements and estimates produce earnings numbers, as better measure of 
economic performance than cash flows. 
Based on their judgment managers assess the economic life of properties, plant and 
equipments, affecting not only the earnings of the fiscal year but also the results of 
the upcoming years, or the election of different methods for assessing inventories 
such as LIFO, FIFO and average cost, affect the outcomes.
Furthermore, managers can judge differently regarding to working capital (inventory 
level selection, policies related to receivable accounts), the level of various expenses 
such as research and development expenses, costs for advertising, promotion etc. All 
these managers judgments and decisions, affects the calculation of fiscal revenue and 
expenditure, as well as the fiscal outcome. 
If we accept that, the initiatives of “earnings management” lead to distortion of the 
financial results it means that financial reports can be considered as poor quality 
reports, and financial information provided to the users and various parties of interest 
is of poor quality. 
Different studies bring different evidences concerning the phenomenon of “earnings 
management”. So reported earnings can be increased or decreased through earnings 
management initiatives. Much of the literature shows that “income-decreasing 
earnings management” is on temporary basis, with the ultimate goal of increased 
future wealth. The accumulated evidence suggests that “income- increasing earnings 
management” is more pervasive than “income-decreasing earning management” 
(paragraph 4, page 11, Benish, 2001). Manager’s income increasing preferences is 
in conflict with the interests of other stakeholders who prefer timely indication of 
potential problems. This also conflicts with external auditors who prefer income-
decreasing choice out of self –protection.
Motives that may lead to initiatives of “earnings management” are those related to 
capital market, contractual motives etc. (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). So investors use 
accounting information to asses their stock, and often can be involved in earnings 
management initiatives. Empirical results show that these initiatives are met rather 
frequently. Such a situation can be the case of Initial Public Offerings in the capital market 
(IPO) (Teoh 1998). Earnings can be managed deliberately to favour or not contractual 
relations with third parties. So earnings figures and other accounting information 
are widely used in both “explicit” and “implicit” contract to align the incentives of 
management and external stakeholders. For example certain studies highlight cases 
of earnings management initiatives in order to avoid obstacles in relation to informal 
lending (Benish and Press, 1993; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994). Others 
bring argument that managers may increase earnings in order to increase their current 
or forthcoming remuneration or to increase their job security (Healy 1985; Dechhow 
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and Sloan,1991; Gaver et al., 1995; Holthausen 1995). In addition P.Sercu, H. Vander 
Bauwhede and M. Willekens (2002) bring evidence concerning earnings management 
in order to reduce taxes also regarding credit policies affecting relations with banks or 
other creditors.
Considering the purpose of this paper, which seeks to obtain evidence of “earnings 
management” initiatives in entities that operate in the Albanian market, the research 
question provided is: 
Are managers involved in earnings management initiatives?
To answer the research question, a testable hypothesis is developed on earnings 
management phenomenon in Albanian Market, and it is formulated as below: 
H-Companies that operate in the Albanian market involve in “earnings management” 
initiatives. 
If we refer to previous studies, many of them examine the use of absolute value, of 
discretionary accruals, or abnormal accruals to make possible to displace income 
in different fiscal years. Models used to estimate accruals are different and aim to 
separate them in to discretionary and nondiscretionary components. The most popular 
models are DeAngelo (1986) Model, Healy (1985) Model, the Jones (1991) Model, 
the Modified Jones Model (Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995), the Industry Model 
(Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney 1995), and the Cross-Sectional Jones Model DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994). Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) evaluated the performance of 
these models to identify the phenomenon of “earnings management”, also stated that 
the Modified Jones Model provides the most powerful test of earnings management. 
In addition, different authors have defined this model as an efficient tool in the 
detection of abnormal accruals, which shows that companies (managers) involve in 
earnings management practices. Based on these results Modified Jones Model is used 
to test the hypothesis developed in this paper.
Methodology and sample selection 
Empirical analysis is based on a valid sample of 75 firm year observation. It consider 
historical data for a three-year period (2009-2011) from entities selected, mainly from 
the private sector.
The reason of choosing private companies is that they are more closely held, have 
greater managerial ownership, major capital providers often have insider access to 
corporate information and capital providers take a more active role in management. 
Moreover, their financial statements are not widely distributed to the public and are 
more likely to be influenced by tax objectives (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).
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The selection criteria for the companies included in the sample are listed as follows:
 - Companies should have financial statements for the period of 2009-2011.
 - Companies with less than three years of activity, exclude from the sample
 - Consistent with previous research, firms in banking and insurance industry 
exclude from the sample, because of the different industry characteristics.
Model specification
Based on the results of the above-mentioned literature, Modified Jones Model is used 
to provide evidence of earnings management phenomenon in the Albanian context.
The modified Jones model (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995) is one of the models used 
to determine quality of earnings (earnings management). Accounting fundamentals 
are used to separate accruals into nondiscretionary (normal) and discretionary 
(abnormal) components. The absolute value of the abnormal component determines 
the quality of earnings. Larger the absolute value of discretionary accrual, lower the 
quality of earnings (Dechow et. al., 1995).
Opportunistic earnings management is manifested by the estimates made in reporting 
accruals. Change in total accruals (TA) over time can correspond to manipulated 
earnings. However, as Jones (1991) suggested, the non-manipulated earnings may 
not be constant over time and be driven by some accounting fundamentals (such as 
revenues adjusted for receivables, property, plant and equipment). In this approach, 
opportunistic earnings management is captured by the residuals from a regression of 
total accruals (TA) on accounting fundamentals, referred to as discretionary accruals 
or abnormal accrual. 
The formula used for total accruals calculation is:
TA = Δ CAit - Δ CLit - Δ Cash it + Δ STDit – Dep it (1)
where: 
Δ CA  =  the change in current assets from year t-1 to t
Δ CL  =  the change in current liabilities from year t-1 to t
Δ Cash = the change in cash and cash equivalents from year t-1 to t
Δ STD = change in debt included in current liabilities from year t-1 to t (which 
in fact belongs to current liabilities but that is determined by any short-term or long-
term bank loan, its repayment ends in the year t.
Dep  = depreciation and amortization expense
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After calculating Total accruals Jones Modified Model is used, regressing total accruals 
scaled by lagged total assets, with other variables as expressed in equation (2). The 
variables in the accrual expectation model are scaled by lagged total assets to allow 
for any heteroskedasticity being present in the regression.
 
where:
A i,t-1 = total assets in the beginning of the year 
Δ Rev  = change in sales from year t-1 to t
Δ AR = change in receivable accounts from year t-1 to t 
PPE = property plant and equipment
ε  = statistical error
Jones Modified Model calculate the discretionary accruals (DA) or abnormal accrual 
(used as a proxy for earning management) as residuals from a regression of TA 
(expressed from the equation 3)
Error term determines exactly abnormal accruals, whose absolute value is used as 
an indicator of “earnings management.” The larger this value, lower is the quality of 
reported earnings.
Empirical results and discussions
Table 1 and table 2 provide a summary of statistics and analysis of variance regarding 
the dependent variable and the other variables considered in OLS model used 
for calculation of total accruals scaled by total lagged assets, using 75 firm-year 
observations, including 25 cross-sectional units.
  TA it                                  1                      Δ Rev it - Δ AR it                  PPE it
  -------   =   β0  +   β1t   --------  +  β2t --------------------------- + β3t  -----------   (2)
  Ai,t-1                              Ai,t-1                           Ai,t-1                            Ai,t-1
   TA it                                   1                      Δ Rev it - Δ AR it                   PPE it
DA it   =  -------   -   (β0  +   β1t   --------  +  β2t ---------------------------- + β3t  ----------- )  (3)
   Ai,t-1                              Ai,t-1                             Ai,t-1                            Ai,t-1
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Table 1: Summary of statistics
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value
const 0.206336 0.085308 2.4187 0.01814 **
1/ Ai,t-1 -366.921 31.9084 -11.499 <0.00001 ***
(Δ Rev it - Δ AR it)/ Ai,t-1 0.13111 0.0115484 11.3531 <0.00001 ***
PPE/ Ai,t-1 -0.732708 0.142384 -5.146 <0.00001 ***
Mean dependent var 0.043002
Sum squared resid 24.78364
R-squared 0.688482
F(3, 71) 52.30529
Log-likelihood -64.89647
Schwarz criterion 147.0629
S.D. dependent var 1.036871
S.E. of regression 0.590817
Adjusted R-squared 0.675319
P-value(F) 5.92E-18
Durbin-Watson 1.455382
rho -0.092066
White's test for heteroskedasticity
Null hypothesis: heteroskedasticity not present
Test statistic: LM = 44.3404
with p-value = P(Chi-square(9) > 44.3404) = 1.2215e-006
Model 1: Pooled OLS, using 75 observations
Included 25 cross-sectional units
Time-series length = 3
Dependent variable: RT/Ai,t-1
T. LLukani, V. karapici - Earnings ManagEMEnT: ObViOus phEnOMEnOn in aLbanian MarkET   85
Table 2: Analysis of Variance
Sum of squares df Mean square
 Regression 54.7739 3 18.25
 Residual 24.7836 71 0.349065
 Total 79.5575 74 1.0751
 R^2 = 54.7739 / 79.5575 = 0.688482
 F(3, 71) = 18.258 / 0.349065 = 52.3053 [p-value 5.92e-018]
This model accounts for significantly more variance in the criterion variable than would 
be expected by chance, since the p value of the F(3,71)=0. In addition, considering 
the goodness of fit test, it can be observed that the regression model can explain 
68.84 of the variation of the dependant variable. Furthermore, Durbin–Watson 
statistic used to detect the presence of autocorrelation in the residuals (prediction 
errors) from the regression analysis, stands less than 2 (Durbin–Watson statistic = 
1.455382) indicating that there is little evidence of positive serial correlation, but also 
this value is more than 1, so there is no cause for concern. While White test shows that 
heteroskedasticity is not present. From the table of statistics it can be seen that all the 
estimators considered in the model appears to be reliable and statistically significant 
at 95% level of confidence. So, the coefficient for the change in revenues, reduced 
by change in receivable accounts, scaled by lagged total assets, is positive (0.13) and 
statistically significant for the average regression. Also, as expected, the coefficient for 
property, plant and equipment scaled by lagged total assets is significantly negative 
(-0.73).
After confirming the importance of the OLS Modified Jones Model, the next step in 
the processing and analysis of data coincides with the division of total accruals in 
discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals. The difference between total accruals 
scaled to total lagged assets in the beginning of the year and accruals under the 
Modified Jones Model, or in other words, the error term (in absolute value) is the 
indicator used to identify “earnings management”. From estimates, these values shows 
that entities in the Albanian market are involved in earnings management initiatives.
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Table 3: The absolute values of abnormal accruals according Jones Modified Model
 
Abnormal Accruals 
(the residual) acccording Jones 
Modified Model
Absolute value of 
abnormal accruals
firm-year 
observation I II III I II III
1 -0.09 0.24 0.1 0.09 0.24 0.1
2 -0.05 -0.14 0.66 0.05 0.14 0.66
3 -0.19 0.44 0.04 0.19 0.44 0.04
4 -0.41 0.1 -0.12 0.41 0.1 0.12
5 -0.04 0.21 -1.7 0.04 0.21 1.7
6 0.48 0 0.4 0.48 0 0.4
7 -0.35 -0.13 0.08 0.35 0.13 0.08
8 -0.31 2.68 0.14 0.31 2.68 0.14
9 0.06 -0.39 -0.1 0.06 0.39 0.1
10 -0.04 0.4 -2.96 0.04 0.4 2.96
11 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.44
12 0.08 -0.55 -0.09 0.08 0.55 0.09
13 0.56 -0.18 0.01 0.56 0.18 0.01
14 0.26 0.28 0.39 0.26 0.28 0.39
15 -0.22 -0.09 -0.4 0.22 0.09 0.4
16 -0.25 -0.12 -0.18 0.25 0.12 0.18
17 0.08 0.31 0.21 0.08 0.31 0.21
18 -0.05 -0.59 0.17 0.05 0.59 0.17
19 -0.25 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.23
20 -0.15 -0.11 -0.17 0.15 0.11 0.17
21 -0.12 -0.12 0.22 0.12 0.12 0.22
22 -0.14 -0.05 -0.66 0.14 0.05 0.66
23 0.22 0.43 0.25 0.22 0.43 0.25
24 0.23 0.24 0.2 0.23 0.24 0.2
25 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.17
The results expressed in the table 3 shows that 36 from 75 observation, which means 
in 48% there is income decreasing earnings management. It seems that companies 
mostly prefer to manage earnings upwards so avoid small losses and report small 
profits instead.
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Summary and Conclusions
Literature review shows the importance of the “earning management and its 
implications, since it has been of concerned by many researchers. These studies 
are focused mainly in developed countries and only a few of them analyses this 
phenomenon in emerging countries or developing economies..
This paper investigates the earnings management initiatives in the Albanian market 
as well as the importance of Jones Modified Model application, based on a sample 
of 75 firm-year observation, for fiscal years 2009-2011. The results of this study show 
that management engage in earnings management initiatives. In addition, as shown in 
the results of Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995), Modified Jones Model, provides a 
powerful test of earnings management and efficient in identifying abnormal accruals. 
The model works better than chance – meaning that, on average, the predictors 
considered in the model are expected to estimate earning management better than 
just assigned by the chance. In addition, while an R² of.688 is usually grounds for much 
celebration, the model accounts for more than 68% of the variance.
Therefore, this paper provides evidence of earnings management in the Albanian 
market, while it is needed further research to consider earnings management, and 
its relations with factors such as ownership, corporate governance, firm size, financial 
leverage etc. Since the quality of reported earnings is subject of audit process, it would 
be also of interest to analyse the relation between earnings management and internal 
and external audit quality, in the Albanian context. 
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